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Mismanagement-the breach of common law1 or statutory2 duties
owed by directors to their corporations-seems to be an inescapable fact
of corporate life. It plagues corporations whether they are public3 or
closely held,4 financial 5 or nonfinancial, successful6 or failing.7 Share-
1. The common law duties of care and loyalty to the corporation arise from statutes
vesting the right to manage the corporation in its board of directors, see, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (Supp. 1978); Act of July 9, 1957 Ill. Laws, § 33, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32,
§ 157.33 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); cf. CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West 1977) (defining
directors' duty of care as "such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent
person in a like position would use under similar circumstances").
2. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 174 (1975) (directors liable to corporation, and to
creditors in event of dissolution or insolvency, for unlawful dividend payments, stock
purchases, or redemptions); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 719(a), 720 (McKinney 1963 & Supp.
1978) (liability under certain circumstances for loans to directors, dividends, stock re-
purchases and other distributions to shareholders, misappropriation of corporate assets,
and negligent mismanagement).
3. See Selheimer v. Manganese Corp., 423 Pa. 563, 567, 582, 224 A.2d 634, 637, 645
(1966) (400,000 Class A shares, par $2.00, held by public, who elected three of seven
directors; 200,000 Class B shares, par $0.20, held by defendant directors, who elected re-
maining four; liability based upon "gross mismanagement").
4. See, e.g., Belcher v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 348 F. Supp. 61, 79-83, 102-03,
108-12, 124-27, 143-47, 153-54 (N.D. Ala. 1968) (numerous instances of self-dealing by
president of family lumber company); Chesapeake Constr. Corp. v. Rodman, 256 Md. 531,
532-33, 261 A.2d 156, 156-57 (1970) (conveyance of teal estate to corporation at inflated
price by its president and majority shareholder).
5. See Note, Public Creditors of Financial Institutions: The Case for a Derivative Right
of Action, 86 YALE L.J. 1422, 1423-25 (1977) (77% of recent life insurance company in-
solvencies and 81-91% of recent bank failures due to self-dealing by insiders and manage-
ment dishonesty).
6. In Bartle v. Markson, 299 F. Supp. 958, 963-64 (N.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 423 F.2d 637
(2d Cir. 1970), the assets of Markson Bros., Inc. were stripped by another corporation,
Son-Mark Industries, Inc., specially organized for that purpose. Markson Bros. eventually
went bankrupt and its creditors brought suit successfully against directors who engineered
the scheme. For many years prior to the initiation of the stripping plan, Markson Bros.
had been one of the soundest companies in central New York state, with a Dun & Brad-
street credit rating of AAA-1. Id. at 961. For a discussion of the Markson litigation, see
Knepper, Liability of Corporate Officers for Debts of Financially Troubled Corporations,
81 Cohi. L.J. 389, 392-93 (1976). Schemes like this one reappear from time to time in
reported cases. See, e.g., Saracco Tank & Welding Co. v. Platz, 65 Cal. App. 2d 306, 150
P.2d 918 (1944); Darcy v. Brooklyn & N.Y. Ferry Co., 196 N.Y. 99, 89 N.E. 461 (1909).
7. Suits against the directors of an insolvent corporation often are brought by creditors
and involve fraudulent conveyances, see Glenmore Distilleries Co. v. Seideman, 267 F.
Supp. 915, 918 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (salary payments while corporation insolvent), or violation
of statutory liquidation procedures, see Kiernan v. Kahn Davis, Inc., 132 N.J. Eq. 245,
246-47, 28 A.2d 66, 67 (Ch. 1942) (salary and loan repayment after corporation had sub-
stantially ceased doing business and was insolvent). In each of these cases, the organizers
evidently intended the corporation to be successful, and the unlawful conveyances were
"but the reflex of an insolvent man," Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its
Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REv. 505, 542 n.98 (1977). Not infrequently, however, insolvency is
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holders have responded to mismanagement s by filing derivative suits
seeking to enforce directors' duties in the name and for the benefit of
the corporation. These suits have been acclaimed for their effective-
ness in holding directors to the standards of conduct contemplated by
the law.10
Creditors have rarely participated in derivative litigation, since the
law generally does not allow them to do so while the debtor corpora-
tion remains solvent." Until a few years ago this limitation upon
creditors' rights was so well settled that it was seldom discussed in case
law12 or commentary.' 3 Recent securities cases suggest, however, that
anticipated from the outset of the corporate venture. See Yacker v. Weiner, 109 N.J. Super.
351, 356-62, 263 A.2d 188, 192-94 (Ch. 1970), aff'd, 114 N.J. Super. 526, 277 A.2d 417 (App.
Div. 1971) (land development venture accomplished through two corporations, one of
which held substantially all obligations to creditors; after failure of that corporation,
solvent corporation and its directors held liable for creditors' claims).
8. Throughout this Note, the term "mismanagement" is used to denote conduct by
directors that is actionable in a shareholders' derivative action under current standards
of liability.
9. More than 470 derivative suits were reported between 1956 and 1966, Dykstra, The
Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 74, 74-75 9- n.5 (1967); this represented
an increase of about 160 over the number reported between 1946 and 1956, id. Replica-
tion of Dykstra's count for the period 1966-1976 indicates that more than 435 derivative
suits were reported during those years. Memorandum on Derivative Litigation 1966-76
(Nov. 3, 1978) (on file with Yale Law Journal). These cases represent only a fraction of
total litigation. Dykstra, supra, at 75.
10. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949) ("[The stock-
holders' derivative action] was long the chief regulator of corporate management and has
afforded no small incentive to avoid at least grosser forms of betrayal of stockholders'
interests. It is argued, and not without reason, that without it there would be little
practical check on such abuses."); cf. Rostow, To Whom and For What Ends is Corporate
Management Responsible? in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 48 (E. Mason ed.
1959) (stockholders' suit is "the most important procedure the law has yet developed to
police the internal affairs of corporations," but there is hostility toward it "in higher
business circles" and among courts and legislatures). Directors' growing demand for
liability insurance, see Bishop, Understanding D & 0 Insurance Policies, HARv. Bus. Ray.,
Mar.-Apr. 1978, at 20 (85-90% of listed corporations now carry such insurance, in amounts
ranging from $5 million to $50 million), is testimony to their awareness of the risks to
which mismanagement exposes them.
11. See, e.g., Kenrich Corp. v. Miller, 377 F.2d 312, 314 (3d Cir. 1967); Dorfman v.
Chemical Bank, 56 F.R.D. 363, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Fagan v. LaGloria Oil & Gas Co., 494
SAV.2d 624, 628 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) ("basic rule" that directors' breaches of duty do not
create cause of action in creditor of corporation and "well recognized exception" applying
when corporation is insolvent and has ceased doing business). There are exceptions to this
general rule. Creditors' derivative actions have occasionally been maintained on behalf of
solvent financial institutions. See Note, supra note 5, at 1447-52 (citing cases involving
mutual life insurance companies, mutual funds, and private pension plans). In addition,
holders of warrants and convertible debentures have successfully brought suit on behalf
of solvent nonfinancial corporations. See note 14 infra.
12. See Brooks v. Weiser, 57 F.R.D. 491, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("The fact that among
the plethora of derivative suits brought over the generations none even discuss the issue
reflects the obviousness of the proposition that the right to sue derivatively is an attribute
of ownership .... ")
13. Occasional references in legal literature to creditors' derivative suits that have been
allowed by courts almost always assume insolvency of the debtor corporation. See, e.g.,
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this disparity between shareholders' and creditors' rights has begun to
narrow.
14
This Note argues that creditors of a solvent corporation should have
a statutory right to bring suit in the name of the corporation against
its directors for conduct breaching the trust of their office. After survey-
ing creditors' limited rights against directors under current law, the
Note presents the case for a new and expansive creditors' derivative
suit. It concludes by suggesting a few limiting principles appropriate
to the proposed right of action.
I. Traditional Creditors' Rights to Enforce Directors' Duties
A. The Creditors' Bill
Even without statutory authority, creditors in many jurisdictions can
enforce a debtor corporation's cause of action against errant directors
through a creditors' bill in equity.15 Traditionally, the bill required
Campbell, Limited Liability for Corporate Shareholders: Myth or Matter-of-Fact, 63 KY.
L.J. 23, 61-64 (1975); Kempin, Enforcement of Management's Duties to Corporate Cred-
itors, 6 AM. Bus. L.J. 371, 377-78 (1968). But see Note, supra note 5, at 1447-52 (discussing
derivative actions by creditors of solvent financial institutions).
14. In Entel v. Guilden, 223 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), holders of warrants entitling
them to purchase the common stock of an investment company brought suit against
directors for receiving brokerage commissions on company contracts in violation of the
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1976). The relief sought by
plaintiffs was recovery, for the benefit of the investment company, of the commissions
illegally received. 223 F. Supp. at 130. The court denied a motion to dismiss for failure
to establish a private right of action, reasoning that the duties created by the Investment
Company Act were intended to benefit all classes of security-holders, including the plain-
tiff warrantholders. Id. at 132-33. The fact that the plaintiffs would not personally recover
judgment did not concern the court: plaintiffs' status as intended beneficiaries of the
statute was sufficient to ensure their right to enforce it.
Inevitably, in the years following Entel, creditors have attempted to use its rationale to
justify their right to bring suit on behalf of the debtor corporation under other securities
laws. See, e.g., Kusner v. First Pa. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 276, 279-85 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd on
other grounds, 531 F.2d 1234 (3d Cir. 1976) (denying holders of convertible debentures
standing to bring derivative action alleging violation of Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-I to -21 (1976)); Dorfman v. Chemical Bank, 56 F.R.D. 363, 364-65
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (denying holders of ordinary debentures standing to sue under Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976)); Hoff v. Sprayregan, 52 F.R.D. 243, 245-47
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (allowing holders of convertible debentures to sue under Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976)). The influence of these securities cases
has clearly reached courts adjudicating state-law claims. See Brooks v. Weiser, 57 F.R.D.
491, 493-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (court led by plaintiff's complaint to consider Hoff-type argu-
ment, even though cause of action arose solely under state law).
15. See 3A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 1180,
1182 (rev. perm. ed. 1975). The creditor's contract, and thus his legal right to payment in
due course, is an obligation of the corporation, not of its directors. Thus all creditors'
remedies for mismanagement, except those granted by contract, are equitable. The
"creditors' bill" is the form of process by which creditors invoke any of those remedies.
Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U.S. 491, 497 (1923).
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prior exhaustion of legal remedies against the corporation: recovery
of judgment, execution upon it, and usually, return of execution un-
satisfied.' 6 This constituted a prima facie showing of corporate in-
solvency. The joinder of legal and equitable claims permitted by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' 7 and similar developments in state
practice have eliminated the necessity of exhaustion in a prior law-
suit, but have not expanded creditors' substantive rights.18
An exception to the insolvency requirement occurs when directors
have acted with actual intent to defraud creditors. 19 Creditors may then
proceed against the directors of a solvent corporation to satisfy matured
claims,2 0 and may move to avoid fraudulent conveyances even if their
claims have not yet matured.21 Nevertheless, actual fraudulent intent
is difficult to prove,22 and fraudulent-conveyance remedies do not ex-
tend to fiduciary breaches other than fraud.
B. Receivership and Bankruptcy
Not all jurisdictions allow creditors' bills against directors.2 3 Cred-
itors of an insolvent corporation may, however, petition the court for
16. See D. EPSTEIN, DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONS 152-53 (1973). When obtaining a prior
judgment against the debtor corporation would be "impossible or useless," courts have
not required creditors to do so. Steele v. Isman, 164 A.D. 146, 149, 149 N.Y.S. 488, 491
(1914); see Lilienthal v. Betz, 108 A.D. 222, 223, 95 N.Y.S. 849, 850 (1905), rev'd on other
grounds, 185 N.Y. 153, 77 N.E. 1002 (1906) (dissolution of corporation and appointment of
receiver excuses creditors from requirement of exhaustion of remedies).
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 2, 18.
18. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976) (Federal Rules do not abridge, enlarge, or modify any
substantive right). Courts still demand corporate insolvency as a prerequisite to creditors'
suits against directors. See Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Whitelawn Dairies, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 79,
82 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (applying New York law) (creditor must at least show debtor corpora-
tion to be "notoriously insolvent").
19. The presence of actual fraudulent intent establishes a fraudulent conveyance under
§ 7 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA), which defines as fraudulent
"[e]very conveyance made and every obligation incurred with actual intent, ... to hinder,
delay, or defraud either present or future creditors." Insolvency of the debtor is not an
element of a § 7 fraudulent conveyance. Klein v. Rossi, 251 F. Supp. 1, 2 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
Actual intent to defraud may be contrasted with intent presumed in law, exemplified by
§ 4 of the UFCA, which declares conveyances fraudulent if made without fair considera-
tion by a debtor who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent. The primary difference
between actual and presumed intent may lie in their respective burdens of proof. See note
22 infra.
20. The UFCA gives creditors whose claims have matured the right to disregard a
fraudulent conveyance and attach or levy execution upon the property conveyed. UNIFORN
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 9(1)(b).
21. Id. § 10(c).
22. See Sparkman & McLean Co. v. Derber, 4 Wash. App. 341, 349, 481 P.2d 585, 591
(1971) (plaintiff proceeding under § 7 of UFCA must present "clear and satisfactory proof"
of debtor's fraudulent intent, although he need show only "substantial evidence" of in-
tent in order to proceed under § 4).
23. See 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 15, §§ 1180-1181.
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the appointment of a receiver, who can himself enforce the corpora-
tion's cause of action.24
As an alternative to receivership, 25 three or more creditors holding
claims totaling at least $5000 may institute bankruptcy or reorganiza-
tion proceedings against the debtor corporation.26 Like a receiver, the
trustee in such proceedings can enforce corporate causes of action
against directors and recover judgment for the benefit of the debtor's
estate.27 Should the trustee fail or refuse to prosecute the action, cred-
itors may petition the court for permission to proceed with an action
for and in the name of the trustee.28
24. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 291 (1975); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 1201, 1202(a)(2),
1206(b)(1) (McKinney 1963).
25. When the debtor corporation is closely held, some courts recognize that receiver-
ship is an expensive and circuitous route for creditors to follow, and will in appropriate
circumstances allow creditors to pierce the veil of the insolvent debtor corporation "as a
matter of convenience." Burns v. Norwesco Marine, Inc., 13 Wash. App. 414, 419, 535
P.2d 860, 863 (1975); Harrison v. Puga, 4 Wash. App. 52, 63, 480 P.2d 247, 254-55 (1971).
The important circumstance, according to the Harrison court, is whether there are "in-
nocent third party rights involved." Id. at 63, 480 P.2d at 254. If there are, the supervision
of a receiver is appropriate.
More generally, creditors can invoke the piercing doctrine as a convenient remedy to
"random instances of self-dealing and mismanagement" that individually might not be
provable as fraudulent conveyances, but collectively create an air of impropriety that
courts cannot ignore. Clark, supra note 7, at 553; see id. at 540-43, 552-53. For an example
of such a case, see Palmer v. Stokely, 255 F. Supp. 674, 680 (W.D. Okla. 1966) (cancellation
of indebtedness owed to bankrupt corporation by corporation controlled by directors of
bankrupt corporation). Piercing the corporate veil, like other equitable creditors' remedies,
is available only when the debtor corporation is insolvent. See Emhart Corp. v. McLarty,
226 Ga. 621, 623, 176 S.E.2d 698, 700 (1970) (exhaustion of legal remedies required); Burns
v. Norwesco Marine, Inc., 13 Wash. App. 414, 419, 535 P.2d 860, 863 (1975) (exhaustion
not required, but debtor corporation manifestly insolvent).
26. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 303(b)(1), 92 Stat. 2559 (to
be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1)) (effective Oct. 1, 1979) [hereinafter cited as 1978
Bankruptcy Act with citations to statutory sections only]. The creditors' claims must be
noncontingent, and if they are secured, the $5000 minimum must be net of security. Id.
If there are fewer than 12 creditors (excluding employees, insiders, and transferees of
voidable transfers), a single creditor with at least a $5000 claim may commence the
proceeding. Id. § 303(b)(2). Generally, creditors prefer the bankruptcy option only in
extreme cases, due to its high cost. See D. STANLEY & M. GiRTH, BANKRUPTCY 177 (1971)
(costs of administration average 29.3% of total estate in straight-bankruptcy asset cases and
24.9% in Chapter XI reorganization cases).
27. See 1978 Bankruptcy Act, supra note 26, § 323 (trustee's capacity to sue as repre-
sentative of debtor's estate); id. § 541(a)(1) (debtor's estate includes "all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case"); S. REP. No. 989,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1978) (as used in § 541, "property" includes causes of action).
The court's appointment of a reorganization trustee is not automatic in every case, but
is rather "for cause," which includes "fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross misman-
agement of the affairs of the debtor by current management, either before or after the
commencement of the case." 1978 Bankruptcy Act, supra note 26, § 1104(a)(1).
28. See Gochenour v. George & Francis Ball Foundation, 35 F. Supp. 508, 517-18 (S.D.
Ind. 1940), aff'd, 117 F.2d 259 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 566 (1941) (interpreting 11
U.S.C. § 207 (1934) (repealed 1938)).
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C. State Corporation Codes
Statutes often specify acts giving rise to creditors' suits against
directors, and would seem to be an obvious vehicle for avoiding the
common law prohibition of creditors' suits on behalf of solvent corpora-
tions. 29 But these statutes do not authorize such an expansion of
creditors' rights. Often, they explicitly limit rights of action to judg-
ment creditors. 30 When this limitation is missing, it has been judicially
supplied.3 1
II. The Creditors' Derivative Action
A. The Principle of Proprietary Interest
The principle of "proprietary interest" has been offered by some
courts to justify the limitation of creditors' rights. 32 The right to sue
derivatively, they have held, is by its very nature an ownership right,
like dividend participation and voting, vested in shareholders to the
exclusion of all others. This principle, however, has been uniformly
observed neither by courts nor by legislatures. Officers and directors
who are not shareholders have a statutory right in at least one state to
sue on behalf of their corporations,33 and creditors may sue deriva-
29. See note 2 supra (Delaware and New York statutes). But see ABA-ALI MODEL Bus.
CORP. Acr § 48 (Supp. 1977) (liability solely "to the corporation"), construed in Wakeman
v. Paulson, 264 Or. 524, 528-30 & n.3, 506 P.2d 683, 685-86 & n.3 (1973) (barring action at
law by judgment creditor).
30. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 325(b) (1975); N.Y. Bus. CORP. IAvw § 720(b) (Mc-
Kinney 1963).
31. See Waters v. Spalt, 22 Misc. 2d 937, 80 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (construing
§ 58 of New York's Stock Corporation Law, which provided for liability of directors in
certain cases "to such corporation and to the creditors thereof," to create remedy for
judgment creditors only).
32. See Kusner v. First Pa. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 276, 280-83 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd on
other grounds, 531 F.2d 1234 (3d Cir. 1976); cf. Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d
727, 735 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971) (plaintiff, not shareholder or
creditor of corporation, denied standing under FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 because "he has not
complied with this provision's unambiguous requirement-amounting to a legal principle-
that one who does not own shares in a corporation is not qualified to bring a derivative
action").
33. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 719(a), 720 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1978). This right
of action is not technically derivative, but rather original, since it is granted to directors
and officers by statute. Conant v. Schnall, 33 A.D.2d 326, 328, 307 N.Y.S.2d 902, 904 (1970).
Yet the director's suit is functionally identical to the shareholder's suit: "in both cases the
action is prosecuted in the right and for the benefit of the corporation," Tenney v.
Rosenthal, 6 N.Y.2d 204, 210, 160 N.E.2d 463, 466, 189 N.Y.S.2d 158, 163 (1959), and
recovery accrues solely to the corporation. Furthermore, the standard of liability in the
director's suit is identical to the standard in shareholder's suits, since the statute creating
the former "embrace[s] common-law and statutory causes of action imposing liability on
directors ... and covers every form of waste of assets and violation of duty whether as a
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tively if the debtor corporation is insolvent.34
The possession of such rights by nonshareholders suggests that the
law recomizes a broader scope of interests in the corporation than the
principle of proprietary interest would admit. Nevertheless, this prin-
ciple does express an idea that should not be disregarded altogether.
The holders of proprietary interests in a solvent corporation, as the
owners of its assets, are injured whenever mismanagement depreciates
the value of those assets; conversely, they are the ultimate beneficiaries
of any increase in the value of assets resulting from derivative litiga-
tion. Restricting the derivative right to holders of proprietary interests
thus ensures that plaintiffs have a personal stake in the outcome of
derivative litigation, and thereby encourages diligent prosecution of
the corporation's cause of action.35
B. The Theory of Creditor Injury
It has often been assumed that the creditors of a solvent corporation
are not injured at all by its mismanagement; nor, it would follow, are
they benefited by derivative recovery.3 6 If it were true, this assumption
would justify denying creditors the derivative right of action. Con-
temporary financial theory indicates, however, that the assumption
is not correct. The attractiveness of a particular investment depends
upon both its expected rate of return and its risk.37 With a fixed re-
result of intention, negligence, or predatory acquisition." Rapoport v. Schneider, 29
N.Y.2d 396, 400, 278 N.E.2d 642, 645, 328 N.Y.S.2d 431, 435 (1972) (citations omitted).
Like § 720, the statute proposed by this Note would not technically create a derivative
right of action. In view of the similarity between creditors' actions and shareholders'
actions, however, it is convenient to apply the "derivative" label to both. Cf. Tenney v.
Rosenthal, 6 N.Y.2d 204, 210-13, 160 N.E.2d 463, 466-68, 189 N.Y.S.2d 158, 162-65 (1959)
(referring to director's suit brought under § 720 as "director's derivative suit").
34. See note 13 supra; Comment, California's New General Corporation Law: Directors'
Liability to Corporations, 7 PAc. L.J. 613, 630-38 (1976) (discussing CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 316(c) (West 1977)). Moreover, the holders of convertible debentures and other "hybrid"
securities seem to have emerging derivative rights against the directors of solvent corpora-
tions. See note 14 supra.
35. This rationale for the proprietary interest limitation of the derivative right of
action is suggested in Comment, Stockholder's Derivative Actions by Holders of Con-
vertible Debentures, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 760, 776 & n.84 (1973).
36. See, e.g., Appleton v. American Malting Co., 65 N.J. Eq. 375, 380, 54 A. 454, 456
(N.J. 1903) ("creditors can suffer no injury from [illegal payment of dividends] unless the
capital is so impaired as to render the company insolvent"); Kempin, supra note 13, at
378 ("by the time the creditors have been injured the corporation must, by definition,
be unable to pay its debts"; if corporation were solvent "creditors would be in no posi-
tion to complain"); Comment, supra note 35, at 777-80.
37. This basic proposition is derived by economists from a number of assumptions
concerning the behavior of investors towatd risk. The derivation is set out in IV.
LEWELLEN, THE COST OF CAPITAL 8-18 (1969), and somewhat more formally in C. HALEY
& L. SCHALL, THE THEORY OF FINANCIAL DECISIONS 93-105 (1973). An investor's "expected
return" is the interest rate he expects to earn on his investment; his "risk" is measured
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turn, investors38 prefer lower risk; with fixed risk, they prefer a higher
rate of return.39 Risk and return are thought to be commensurable by
investors in that they can be persuaded to hold riskier investments by
higher rates of return.4 0
Mismanagement depletes corporate assets, upon which creditors rely
for repayment. 41 As the creditors' "cushion" shrinks, their risk in-
creases. 42 Within reasonable limits, most creditors could be compen-
sated for increased risk-bearing by an increase in the rate of return,
but, unless they are able to renegotiate their contracts, this is not
possible. The injury that creditors suffer thereby is thus comparable
to a decline in the rate of return. But available remedies do not reflect
this fact. A change in the rate of return confers upon creditors a right
of action against directors.43 A change in risk-bearing does not do so; 44
creditors are instead required to sit by until they suffer "real" injury. 40
by the variance, or dispersion, of the distribution of interest rates that he may possibly
earn. The utility that a rational, risk-averse investor derives from an investment depends
positively upon the former of these two factors and negatively upon the latter. Id. at
102-03.
38. Warrantholders, bondholders, and debentureholders are obviously "investors," yet
so too are trade creditors; the only difference is that their investment is in kind rather
than in currency. The existence of Dun & Bradstreet, with its 75,000 subscribers, see
Letter from Guyon Knight III, Dun & Bradstreet Companies, Inc. (Sept. 18, 1978) (copy
on file with Yale Law Journal), and myriad other credit-rating agencies is persuasive
evidence that trade creditors, like other investors, take risk into account before com-
mitting their resources.
39. W. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY & CAPITAL MARKETS 26-27 (1970).
40. See id. at 28-30 (use of "indifference curves" to represent different combinations
of risk and return yielding equal investor satisfaction).
41. This is obviously true of such forms of mismanagement as excessive compensation
of officers and directors, illegal distributions to shareholders, or sales of corporate property
for inadequate consideration. It is equally true of mismanagement that diminishes the
corporation's future earning potential-by usurping corporate opportunities, for example,
or by causing the corporation to engage in illegal activities that damage its reputation in
the community where it does business-since shareholders and creditors might reasonably
rely upon the corporation's earning potential in making the decision to invest. The
creditors' derivative right contemplated by this Note is intended to reach asset depletion
in all these forms, and would thus be available to prosecute every type of mismanagement
currently actionable in shareholders' suits. See note 8 supra.
42. Risk, the variance of expected returns, increases because the diminution of corpo-
rate assets caused by mismanagement makes it less likely that the corporation will meet
periodic interest payments and repay principal at maturity. A given diminution may in-
crease creditors' risk greatly or hardly at all, depending on the financial position of the
corporation. However, investments with high initial risk due to the small size or low
capitalization of the debtor corporation will become that much more risky following the
depletion of assets.
43. The default in payment of principal occasioned by insolvency is, in effect, a nega-
tive interest payment giving creditors the right to pursue errant directors by legal process.
See pp. 1301-04 suptra.
44. A change in risk-bearing may be actionable under the terms of the credit contract.
See pp. 1307-08 infra.
45. In Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 217-20 (Del. Ch. 1974), modified, 347 A.2d 133
(Del. 1975), holders of convertible subordinated debentures of MGM sought to bring a
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It might be argued that creditors should anticipate the mismanage-
ment of solvent debtors and protect themselves against it in their
investment contracts. The restrictive covenants found in debenture
indentures represent one form of contractual protection; 4  security
agreements are another.4 7 The acquisition of a small stock interest in
the debtor corporation is a third.4 8 Yet each of these fails to protect
all creditors as effectively as shareholders are protected by the deriva-
tive right of action.
First, smaller creditors may be hampered in their efforts to obtain
effective protection by a lack of economic bargaining power.49 Second,
there are many financing transactions for which complex and costly
contractual arrangements are inappropriate.50 Finally, indentures and
derivative suit against its directors for paying a dividend "improvidently and for the
financial benefit of" Kerkorian, the controlling stockholder. Id. at 217. The debenture
holders alleged, inter alia, that "the ability of MGM to pay interest and principal on the
Debentures held by class members became questionable," id. at 221 n.6, and that conse-
quently the market price of their securities (which were publicly traded) dropped, id.
at 217. The court held that the plaintiffs, who brought the action under state law, were
mere creditors and dismissed the derivative suit for want of standing. Id. at 219. An allied
class action failed at the summary-judgment stage. Id. at 220-22.
46. The indenture is a lengthy, highly detailed contract between the debtor corpora-
tion and a trustee for the holders of bonds or debentures. Commonly used for issuance of
debt securities to the general public, indentures are subject, with comparatively minor ex-
ceptions, to the requirements of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-
77bbbb (1976), which defines eligibility requirements for trustees and imposes upon them
certain duties and obligations. See W. CARY, CORPORATIONS 1262-64 (4th ed. 1969). The
indenture contains elaborate covenants intended to save the debtor's assets from dissipa-
tion or encumbrance. Typical indenture covenants limit subsequent debt and pledge of
assets, restrict dividends and other distributions to shareholders, regulate investments and
lease transactions by the corporation, and provide for maintenance of minimum working
capital and liabilities-to-assets margins. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, COMMENTARIES ON
INDENTURES 326-467 (1971); Garret, A Borrower's View of the Model Corporate Debenture
Indenture Provisions, 21 Bus. LAw. 675, 680-81 (1966).
47. By taking a security interest in real estate or other property that is unlikely to be
diminished in value by the illicit activities of management, the creditor can insulate
himself to some extent from the consequences of mismanagement. If on the other hand
the creditor's collateral consists of inventory, accounts receivable, or other personalty
subject to misappropriation or misuse, the existence of a security interest creates the
possibility of injunctive protection against waste of the mortgaged property. See Devereux
v. Berger, 253 Md. 264, 252 A.2d 469 (1969) (enforcing injunction in favor of secured
creditor against debtor corporation and its president, which restrained impairment or
diminution of corporate assets); G. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 134 (2d ed. 1970),
48. This alternative, which amounts to assuming the dual status of creditor and share-
holder, might in many cases be cheaper than negotiating and preparing a complex credit
instrument, and would assure the availability of injunctive relief, which may be un-
available to an unsecured creditor. See note 52 infra.
49. Moreover, acquiring a stock interest in a closely held debtor may be difficult or
impossible for any creditor, large or small. See note 65 infra.
50. Although banks and other institutional lenders often incorporate restrictive
covenants into their loan agreements and take security interests in the property of their
corporate debtors, see B. MANNING, LEAL CAPITAL 94-96 (1977), interbusiness financing
seldom makes use of these arrangements, see FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FINANCING SMALL
BUSINESS, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 484-96 (Comm. Print 1958) (describing credit devices by
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similar contracts may not have been written to cover all activities that
would be actionable in a shareholders' suit,51 nor may they provide
the lender with a flexible legal response to such activities. 52 More gen-
erally, there are three paradigmatic situations in which creditors cannot
or do not obtain effective contractual protection against mismanage-
ment: (1) the refusal case, when the debtor corporation would not be
willing to grant such protection on terms acceptable to the creditor
even if negotiations were costless; (2) the transaction costs case, when
the grant of protection would occur but for the fact that the cost of
negotiation is prohibitive in view of the size of the creditor's invest-
ment; and (3) the oversight case, when the grant would occur, but the
creditor, unaware of the need for contractual protection, neglects to
negotiate for it.
These three cases outline the creditor injury tolerated by current
legal rules. Creditors are injured because they are precluded from ef-
fective contractual protection by debtors' refusal to give it, by excessive
costs of negotiation, or by lack of foresight or sophistication. Smaller,
nonfinancial creditors seem especially prone to the last of these dis-
abilities, while the first, and to a lesser degree the second, are shared by
banks and other sophisticated lenders.
The gravity of creditor injury can also be influenced by the nature
which large businesses finance smaller ones). Such financing is a large and stable part of
the corporate financial framework. See R. HUNGATE, INTERBUSINEss FINANCING 11-14 (1962)
(Small Business Research Series No. 3) (for decade 1947-56, accounts payable by corpora-
tions averaged 136.6% of commercial bank business loans).
51. Mismanagement that would be actionable in a stockholders' derivative suit and
would, if carried far enough, breach a covenant in the credit contract, is not actionable
by creditors if stopped short of the point of breach. For instance, although conversion of
corporate property by directors might eventually breach a minimum working-capital
covenant, illicit depletion of assets up to the point of breach cannot be prosecuted by
creditors. Cf. Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215 (Del. Ch. 1974), modified, 347 A.2d 133
(Del. 1975) (plaintiffs alleging improper declaration of dividends by directors could not
claim any violation of their debenture indenture). Tighter specification of the covenants
eases this problem, but also increases both the complexity of the contract and the cost of
its negotiation and preparation. This in turn narrows the class of transactions for which
effective contractual protection is feasible.
52. If the covenants are drafted with sufficient care to "catch" a given act of misman-
agement, the credit contract translates that act into an event of default, thereby allowing
the creditor or the trustee acting on behalf of debtholders to accelerate the maturity of
the debt. See A.MERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 46, at 207, 217 (examples of such
default and acceleration clauses). It has been held that acceleration of indebtedness is an
adequate legal remedy against a solvent corporation, thus barring creditors from equitable
relief. See Kelly v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 11 F. Supp. 497, 510-12 (S.D.N.Y.
1935), rev'd on other grounds, 85 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1936). In contrast, shareholders frequently
seek and receive injunctive relief in derivative suits. See, e.g., Petty v. Penntech Papers,
Inc., 347 A.2d 140 (Del. Ch. 1975) (temporary restraining order enjoining stock repurchases
for alleged purpose of maintaining management control); Rebell v. Muscat, 26 A.D.2d 685,
272 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1966) (preliminary injunction restraining increase or alteration of
corporate capitalization or debt structure).
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of the debtor corporation. If the corporation is closely held,53 creditors'
disabilities are magnified because the corporation's shareholders and
directors are likely to be the same people, and hence shareholders' suits
are improbable.5 4
C. Policy Considerations
The creditors of a solvent corporation thus suffer injury from its
mismanagement akin to that caused by the insolvency of the debtor
corporation. Yet even if creditors cannot control mismanagement effec-
tively by legal process or by contract, they can nevertheless anticipate it
in the rates they charge. A creditor whose debtor is mismanaged is ad-
mittedly worse off than he would be if that mismanagement had not
occurred. Investment, however, is probabilistic by nature; creditors
must expect to lose interest or principal on a few loans, and can adjust
their rates so loans that are fully paid make up the difference. Similarly,
creditors must anticipate that events such as mismanagement will cause
some investments to become less secure, even if payments are not
missed. Characterizing a loss of either sort in any single credit transac-
tion as legally cognizable injury disregards the essence of investment
decisions.15
53. If closely held corporations may be defined as those corporations with less than $5
million total assets, in 1973 there were 1,867,165 closely held and 37,505 public corpora-
tions that filed active corporation tax returns. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEP'T OF
TREASURY, 1973 CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS 28. Creditors' investments in closely
held manufacturing corporations totaled $36.6 billion at the end of that year, as against
investments of $319.3 billion in public manufacturing corporations. FEDERAL TRADE COM-
MISSION, QUARTERLY FINANCIAL REPORT FOR MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS 50-51 (4th
quarter 1973).
54. Such actions, however, do arise. The death or falling-out of business associates
sometimes precipitates a shareholders' suit in closely held corporations. See note 4 supra
(citing cases).
55. This argument applies equally well to investments made by shareholders, in-
dicating that a thorough justification for the existence of the shareholders' derivative
action would include an analysis of its systemic economic and social effects.
The tendency of economic actors to allow for anticipated changes in market conditions
is a familiar and important problem in economic-policy analysis. See, e.g., Lucas, Under-
standing Business Cycles, in STABILIZATION OF THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY
7 (K. Brunner & A. Meltzer ed. 1977); Sargent & Wallace, Rational Expectations and
the Theory of Economic Policy, 2 J. MONETARY ECON. 169 (1976). Furthermore, in some
fields of law, expectations are taken into account to minimize the legal significance
of economic impact. See, e.g., United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 509-10
(1945) (power company took riparian interest subject to dominant public interest in
navigation, therefore not entitled to compensation for federal government's alteration of
stream level); In re Valuation Proceedings, 445 F. Supp. 994, 1021-22 (Special Ct. 1977)
(Friendly, J.) ("[W]hen an industry has long been the subject of direct and permanent
regulation, governmental action is taken into account by those investing in it .... [Pro-
vided that] government has not acted beyond its constitutional powers, a condemnee is
not entitled to the recognition of values that have been impaired by .. . [such] govern-
ment action." (footnote omitted)).
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The question of appropriate creditor rights, therefore, cannot be
fully answered by the simple statement that every injury ought to have
a remedy. Creation of a creditors' derivative action would occasion
considerable changes in the corporate credit market, and the desirability
of the action would depend in large part upon the value of these
changes. This value, in turn, can be considered first from the point of
view of the parties to the credit contract and then from a broader social
perspective.
1. The Welfare of Contracting Parties
Creditors are clearly troubled by the prospect of intentional or
negligent mismanagement depleting corporate assets during the term
of their loans, particularly in small corporations in which there are few
assets to deplete.50 Every "bad" loan weakens the lender's portfolio and
ultimately lessens his chance of competitive success. It is small comfort
that losses on a given loan may be recovered by charging higher interest
rates, since competing creditors who are more successful in anticipating,
detecting, and controlling mismanagement can charge lower rates.
Against this backdrop of market competition, creditors concerned by
mismanagement have negotiated contractual provisions with their
debtors to deal with asset depletion, 57 have attempted to bring deriva-
tive actions against directors,"5 and in an unknown number of cases
have refused to extend credit altogether. 9
A derivative action would attach a new legal right to creditors' in-
vestments that would allow creditors to control mismanagement more
effectively. The existence of such a right would benefit creditors both
directly and indirectly. Those with the resources and inclination to
bring suit against directors would themselves attack mismanagement by
legal process; 60 less litigious creditors could shelter under the protec-
56. See FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, supra note 50, at 397; cf. id. at 414-15 (of 670 com-
mercial-bank loan officers interviewed, 84% cited "questionable management ability" and
41% cited "poor moral risk" as "relatively important" factors leading to rejection of small
business loan applications); Patterson, Credit Quality: Lessons of Recent Experience, J.
CoM. BANK LENDING, Oct. 1976, at 17 (Chairman of Morgan Guaranty Trust asserts
"character and experience of management" are of great importance in loan evaluation
process; advises banks to "refuse to let profit considerations seduce us into doing business
with people whose character we question").
57. See note 46 supra.
58. See notes 14 & 45 supra.
59. Cf. note 56 supra (importance of management ability and integrity in assessment
of small business loan applications).
60. Although enforcement would not be without cost, the beneficial effect of the
derivative action would not be wholly dissipated. Every creditor could be expected to
enforce up to the point at which the marginal benefit to him equalled the marginal cost.
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tion provided by such suits. 1
The net effect of the creditors' action on the welfare of the contract-
ing parties would depend on the impact of the action on both the
creditor and the debtor. In two of the three paradigmatic cases of cred-
itor injury,62 this welfare effect would be positive. When failure to
reach a contractual agreement providing protection against mismanage-
ment is attributable either to transactions cost or to creditor oversight,
the existence of the derivative action would cause the creditor to be
better off, and the debtor no worse off, for being able to enjoy the bene-
fits that such an agreement would bring. In the remaining case, the fact
that the debtor refuses to grant protection on terms acceptable to the
creditor indicates that the creditor places less value on the right of
action than the debtor places on freedom from it. Only in this case,
then, would the existence of a derivative action cause a net welfare loss
to the contracting parties. 3
The proportion of debtors that would refuse to give the protection
that would be offered by a creditors' derivative action is probably not
large. Refusal would occur mostly in closely held corporations, whose
stock is not available on the market and whose affairs are not already
scrutinized by public shareholders and their attorneys. Yet the standard
of legal liability for directors of such corporations would be unaffected
by the expansion of creditors' rights, since it would create no new
substantive obligations. Directors would not be responsible for corpo-
rate losses beyond their control.0 4 Increased exposure to suit might
In this way he would maximize the benefit of the new action net of its cost. If the
benefit to a given creditor were at all levels of enforcement less than its cost, he would
not engage in this activity, yet still might benefit from the efforts of others, due to the
"free rider" effect. See note 61 infra.
61. This could be called the "free rider" effect of the creditors' action: those creditors
who cared to supervise and bring suit against debtors would decrease the risk of not only
their own investments, but also the investments of other creditors who chose not to
engage in such enforcement. Creditors' litigation could also help protect shareholders un-
likely to sue due to lack of resources or sophistication.
62. See p. 1308 suPra.
63. Debtors in the refusal case could be expected to respond to the existence of the
creditors' action in several ways. Some closely held debtors might, for example, shift some
or all of their debt financing to equity in order to avoid supervision by outside-debt-
holders. Others might simply shift to smaller creditors unlikely to enforce the derivative
action against them. A few could be expected to leave the corporate sector, either by
becoming unincorporated or by going out of business altogether. The remaining debtors
would preserve their current legal status and financing arrangements and live with un-
wanted derivative action exposure. See note 83 infra (limitations on right of action could
reduce welfare losses of some refusal-case debtors).
64. See Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in Indemnification of
Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1095-1101 (1968) (directors are seldom
held liable in derivative litigation for mere negligence).
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deter some entrepreneurs contemplating mismanagement, 5 but strong
social policies outweigh any welfare loss to such parties.00
2. Social Welfare
The existence of a creditors' derivative action would invite closer
supervision of debtors; before mismanagement can be prosecuted, it
must be detected. One class of likely derivative-action plaintiffs would
be those with a sizable financial stake in the debtor corporation, since
for these creditors, some degree of supervision is routine business. 7
Banks and other financial institutions supply a substantial amount
of the financing for smaller corporations and have considerable invest-
ments in larger ones as well. 8 They may also serve as trustees for
65. Debtors' fear of harassing litigation, an understandable reason for refusal to give
derivative-type protection to creditors, could be assuaged by restrictions on creditors' right
of action. See note 83 infra.
Since a derivative right would be useless to creditors who did not have at least some
access to the debtor's financial reports, some closely held debtors might refuse to give
derivative rights in order to protect the privacy of those reports. One might question
how many debtors would actually fall into this class, since larger lenders typically have
access to debtors' balance sheets and profit and loss accounts, and credit bureaus and the
financial press collect a considerable amount of financial data for the benefit of smaller
creditors. See BUREAU OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS RESEARCH, SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND PUBLIC
ADIINISTR4TION, TEMPLE UNIVERSITY, THE USE OF FINANCIAL RATIOS AND OTHER FINANCIAL
TECHNIQUES AND SERVICES BY SMALL BUSINESS iX, 1-4, 19 (1961) (interview survey of 299
"larger" small businesses in seven Pennsylvania cities; 82.5% who had recourse to bank
financing had been required to submit balance sheet to bank; 64.6% profit and loss ac-
count as well; 69.3% had furnished financial statements to Dun & Bradstreet or other
credit rating agency). One might also question the legitimacy of the privacy interest of
corporations, which are "wholly artificial creation[s] whose internal relations . . . may be
subject to most complete and penetrating regulation," Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 549 (1949). Nevertheless, there are limiting devices available to
protect debtors' most pressing privacy concerns, and these could be employed to restrict
creditors' right of action. See note 83 infra.
66. Adverse welfare effects on the parties could be virtually eliminated if creditors'
derivative right were waivable by agreement. Then, whenever debtors valued freedom
from creditor intervention more than creditors valued the right to intervene, they would
insert a waiver clause into the credit contract reflecting this relative evaluation. But a
waivable creditors' right would poorly serve important social goals of law enforcement
and protection of minority shareholders, see pp. 1313-15 infra, since waiver would be
likely to occur in cases in which directors strongly wished to preserve their freedom to
mismanage with impunity.
67. Creditors with a large financial interest in the debtor tend also to be those with a
longer-term interest. See Patterson, supra note 56, at 15-16. Compared to trade creditors
whose claims may mature in 30 days, long-term lenders should be more concerned with
mismanagement prior to the maturity of their claims.
68. In the first quarter of 1978, loans from banks accounted for 29.7% of the total
liabilities (excluding stockholders' equity) of manufacturing, mining, and trade corpora-
tions with total assets under $5 million, and 11.6% of the total liabilities of such corpora-
tions with assets equal to or exceeding this amount. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,




public debentureholders. 09 In some trades a good deal of the capital of
smaller companies is provided by larger, nonfinancial creditors who
are often suppliers.70 The existence of a derivative right of action might
encourage creditors like banks and large suppliers to monitor the
finances and oversee the operations of their debtors more closely than
before.7 1
Though self-interest would motivate this additional supervision, its
benefits might be felt by others, including debtors.7 2 Poor manage-
ment is a problem in many companies, and in one form or another is
responsible for a great number of business failures each year.73 Only
a small portion of poor management is actionable "mismanagement,"74
but careful oversight by commercially sophisticated creditors whose
financial interest is coupled with working knowledge of the debtor's
affairs could help to correct sloppy business practices, whether or not
they could be the subject of litigation. The result might be fewer
failures and less disruption in the business community.75
Their sophistication aside, however, creditors are in many instances
69. See Trust Indenture Act of 1939, § 310(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(a) (1976) (indenture
trustee must be corporation with minimum combined capital and surplus of $150,000,
authorized under laws of state of its incorporation to exercise corporate trust powers, and
subject to supervision or examination by specified governmental authority).
70. R. HUNcATE, supra note 50, at 105-41 (arrangements by which large supplier/dis-
tributors provide substantial, and indeed essential, finance to their smaller customers). For
example, drug distributors often put in a base stock of inventory for new owner-operators,
that ranges in value (in 1962) from $10,000 to $60,000. Id. at 121. Large feed mills finance
equipment, perhaps worth $100,000, for their dealers and other small mills. Id. at 125.
Such large trade creditors sometimes bring suit against directors of their debtors for mis-
management. See, e.g., Huron Milling Co. v. Hedges, 257 F.2d 258, 260 (2d Cir. 1958)
(impairment of capital; long-term supplier held judgment for $15,353.88); Glenmore
Distilleries Co. v. Seideman, 267 F. Supp. 915, 917 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (fraudulent conveyance;
supplier had judgment equal to $81,072.96 at time of suit).
71. Although such oversight could be formalized in, for example, periodic audits of
the debtor's balance sheets, information gathered through more informal channels, such
as contacts with other creditors or customers of the debtor, could well be more effective
and less costly. See generally Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite-The Dynamics of Coercive
Collection, 80 YALE UJ. 1, 24-30 (1970) (describing credit-information network in business
community).
72. Cf. I G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 250-61 (1965) (dis-
cussing Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925)) (close involvement of sophisticated lender
with business affairs of debtor may avert debtor's failure due to imprudent management).
73. See DUN & BRADSTREET, THE BUSINESS FAILURE RECORD 1975, at 12 (42.8% of business
failures in 1975 were caused by management fraud (0.5%), neglect (1.1%), or incom-
petence (41.2%)).
74. See note 8 supra.
75. Oversight would also come from another, less obvious source. The existence of a
right of action would encourage directors of closely held corporations (many subject for
the first time to derivative liability) to purchase liability insurance. Insurers would have
to satisfy themselves through independent investigation that the manner of operation of
an applicant corporation rendered its directors insurable.
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the only possible plaintiffs70 to vindicate the rights of closely held
corporations and thus to hold directors to the standards of conduct
embodied in corporate law.77 Offering a derivative right to creditors
76. Without a creditors' derivative right, causes of action of closely held corporations
are often unenforceable by legal process. Legislatures considering the action may find
instructive two lines of Supreme Court cases in which standards for judicial review have
been relaxed to enforce rights that are otherwise unenforceable. In recent ius teriii cases,
standing to assert the constitutional rights of third persons has depended upon the in-
ability of such third persons to assert their own rights in timely and vigorous fashion.
This requirement has been variously phrased, see, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106,
116 (1976) (plurality opinion of Blackmun, J.) ("some genuine obstacle" to third party's
assertion of rights); id. at 126 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (such
assertion "in all practical terms impossible"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481
(1965) (third-person rights "likely to be diluted or adversely affected" unless standing
granted). Often, of course, the corporation meets even the strictest standard of incapacity
set out in these cases, since a majority of its directors and shareholders are implicated in
the mismanagement, and thus it is "in all practicable terms impossible" for the corporation
to enforce its cause of action.
The Court has reiterated its concern for enforcing otherwise unenforceable legal rights
in its mootness cases. Review has sometimes been granted when it might otherwise be
denied, if the asserted injury is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Southern Pac.
Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911), quoted in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399-
400 (1975); see Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969). Again, the analogy is useful:
director misconduct in many closely held corporations "evades review" unless it leads to
insolvency within the statutory limitations period. Nor can this analogy be dismissed by
the simple observation that these cases involve the constitutional rights of natural persons,
whereas derivative litigation deals with the rights of corporations. Enforcement of the
corporation's rights through derivative litigation is perhaps the most effective way to
enforce corporate law, a policy of clear social importance.
77. The enforcement of corporate law has independent significance if directors' duties
ought to be enforced even when their breach does not injure the corporation and its
creditors. Corporate law may seek to maintain public confidence in the integrity of man-
agement, compare Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d 843, 846 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 972 (1956) (interpreting § 16(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(b) (1976)) ("policy of the statute is to protect minority stockholders and the public
against manipulated market fluctuations") with Champion Home Builders Co. v. Jeffress,
490 F.2d 611, 619 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974) (absence of corporate damage
irrelevant in assessing § 16(b) liability), or it may seek to enforce concepts of morality re-
garding "fair play" by directors, cf. Deutsch, Correspondence, 88 YALE L.J. 235 (1978) (bona
fides of management can only be enforced by corporate law flexible enough to adjust to
entrepreneurs' attempts to circumvent fixed legal rules). In simplest terms, corporate law
may enforce the notion that corporate directors should under no circumstances profit from
knowing breaches of trust. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464-65, 164 N.E. 545,
546-47 (1928) (Cardozo, J.) (standard of fiduciary duty is "[n]ot honesty alone, but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive"; liability imposed even though there was no
proof of injury resulting from breach of trust).
Concern for law enforcement both to redress injury and to maintain fiduciary standards
has played an important role in the development of the shareholders' derivative action.
See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 321-22 (1936) (granting standing to preferred share-
holders to bring derivative action) ("IT]he owners of preferred stock may be the only
persons having a proprietary interest in the corporation who are in a position to protect
its interests against what is asserted to be an illegal disposition of its property. A court
of equity should not shut its doors against them." (footnote omitted)); Diamond v.
Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 503, 248 N.E.2d 910, 915, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 85 (1969) (allowing
derivative action regardless of lack of allegation of injury to corporation) ("There is
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would allow private enforcement actions to reach a large class78 of
corporations from which they are foreclosed today, thereby encourag-
ing more honest behavior on the part of corporate management.7 9
Ill. Limitations on the Creditors' Right of Action
Expansion of creditors' rights would entail the possibility of abuse by
creditors' attorneys, who could bring groundless actions to earn con-
tingent fees from settlement, and by creditors themselves, who might
use the threat of litigation as a lever to accelerate the maturity of their
claims.80 Conflicts of interest among plaintiffs could pose an additional
problem, since competitors who were nominal creditors of the corpora-
tion could bring derivative suits intended primarily to harass manage-
ment. These problems are real, but also familiar. The specter of merit-
less litigation has haunted shareholders' derivative actions since their
inception,"' and various limiting devices have evolved in response. 82
Most of these devices could be employed in analogous forms in cred-
itors' suits.8 3
ample room ... here ... for a 'private Attorney General' to ... enforce proper behavior
on the part of corporate officials through the medium of the derivative action .... Only
by sanctioning such a cause of action will there be any effective method to prevent the...
abuse of corporate office complained of." (citations omitted)).
78. See notes 53 & 54 supra (closely held corporations).
79. The encouragement of managerial honesty has in fact played a considerable role
in the development of derivative remedies. For example, the California legislature re-
cently suspended the contemporaneous-ownership requirement in shareholders' suits, see
note 82 infra, when the plaintiff can make a preliminary showing that, inter alia, "no
other similar action has been or is likely to be instituted," CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(b)(1)(ii)
(West 1977), and "unless the action can be maintained the defendant may retain a gain
derived from defendant's willful breach of a fiduciary duty," id. § 800(b)(1)(iv).
80. A creditor might wish to accelerate his loan even in the absence of mismanage-
ment if, for example, interest rates had increased since the date of the loan. Requiring
courts to supervise settlements of creditors' actions could largely eliminate arm-twisting of
this sort, since the institution of legal process would itself prevent creditors from obtaining
a self-serving compromise of their claim against directors. See p. 1317 infra.
81. In 1944 a special committee of the New York Chamber of Commerce reported that
the filing of meritless derivative suits by shareholders in that state had become a "'racket'
reaching 'epidemic proportions.'" Comment, supra note 34, at 634-35. The New York
security-for-expenses statute was adopted in response to that report. See V. CARY, supra
note 46, at 931-32. For a virulent critique of both the report and the statute, see Horn-
stein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New York, 32 CALIF. L. REV.
123 (1944).
82. These devices include requirements that plaintiffs: (1) hold a minimum number of
shares at the time of the alleged misconduct (the contemporaneous-ownership rule); (2)
make prior demand for action upon directors and perhaps shareholders; (3) furnish
security-for-expenses bonding; (4) adequately represent the interests of the class of share-
holders; and (5) submit to court scrutiny of settlements. Different rules have evolved in
different jurisdictions, and any given jurisdiction may not have adopted all of these
limitations. See generally Note, Derivative Suits-Mechanics, Motives and Suggested Im-
provements, 36 B.U. L. Rav. 78, 78-91 (1956).
83. The purpose of these limiting devices would be to strike a reasonable balance
between debtors' welfare on the one hand and the social value of law enforcement on the
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As a first step, creditor-plaintiffs should be required to show that they
held an obligation of the debtor corporation when the alleged mis-
management occurred,8 4 and that they continue to hold the obliga-
tion at the time of suit.8 5 Failure to adopt these rules would enlarge
the class of potential derivative-action plaintiffs to include those who
acquired a claim against the corporation with the intention of bring-
ing suit, and those whose only remaining interest would be the prosecu-
tion of an action against directors. Litigation by such plaintiffs could
be greatly abused, since their sole interest might be settlement for per-
sonal, not corporate, benefit. Debtors' legitimate interest in protection
from such "strike suits" seems to outweigh any law-enforcement value
they might have.
Experience with shareholders' suits suggests, however, that these
rules alone would not control abuse of the creditors' action. Creditors
other. Debtors' welfare would be of concern only in the refusal case, since only in that
case would the existence of the derivative action have an adverse effect. See p. 1311
supra. The limiting devices would attempt to distinguish among debtors on the basis of
their reason for refusal: (1) the need to avoid creditor supervision in order to accomplish
contemplated mismanagement; (2) the desire for privacy for legitimate business reasons;
or (3) the fear of strike suits and meddlesome litigation. See pp. 1311-12 & note 65 supra. If
refusals were always motivated by a single one of these reasons, an ideal limiting device
would foreclose all actions against debtors whose refusal was motivated by reasons (2) or
(3), and foreclose none against debtors motivated by reason (1). Such a device would
eliminate all adverse effects on debtor welfare except those arising from an efficient law-
enforcement policy. In practice, however, this degree of discrimination would probably
be unattainable, since practicable limiting devices could not distinguish among debtors on
the basis of their undisclosed motivation, especially if some debtors had mixed motives for
refusing to grant contractual protection. The limiting rules presented here try to ap-
proximate ideal discrimination by falling most heavily upon plaintiffs who would seem
unlikely to bring meritorious claims with an intention to press them forcefully to a con-
clusion.
84. In the context of the shareholders' suit, this is the contemporaneous-ownership
rule. See note 82 supra. A creditor who could not satisfy the rule would have suffered
no injury from mismanagement, in either sense in which the term "injury" is used in
this Note. He would not have been injured according to standard financial analysis, be-
cause the risk of his investment would not have changed since he made it. See pp. 1305-
06 supra. Nor would he have been injured in an expectational sense: even if he did
not know of the mismanagement at the time he acquired his claim, he could have been
expected to realize that the risk of corporate investments is sometimes greater than it
appears to be due to undetected mismanagement in the past. See p. 1309 supra.
85. This is a common if not universal requirement in shareholders' actions. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Bus. Coap. LAw § 626(b) (McKinney 1963); 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTIcE 23.1.17
(2d ed. 1978) (discussing FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1). In conjunction with the contemporaneous-
debt requirement, see note 84 supra, it would tend to foreclose suits by "roll-over
creditors," i.e., creditors who provide more or less permanent lines of credit to the
corporation through a series of short-maturity loans. Empirically, however, this class
of creditors may not be significant, since industry studies indicate that longer-term
financing, even that supplied by trade creditors, tends to utilize credit devices of some
permanence. See R. HUNGATE, supra note 50, at 105-41. Should this treatment of roll-over
creditors appear too harsh, however, an alternative would be to suspend the contempo-
raneous-debt requirement, provided the plaintiff had no knowledge of the alleged mis-
management prior to acquiring his claim.
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satisfying both rules could still be expected to bring suits of question-
able merit motivated by the prospect of lucrative settlements. In the
context of the shareholders' action, security-for-expenses bonding is the
traditional legislative response.80 A more extreme alternative would
be outright limitation of the right of action to creditors with a sub-
stantial financial stake in the corporation. The required investment
could be specified either as a proportion of total corporate assets" or
as a fixed dollar sum, say $10,000. Bonding seems preferable ss since
directors would otherwise have the option of avoiding creditor super-
vision altogether by not soliciting credit from any single source in
excess of the statutory exemption.89 Whether the right of action is
limited absolutely or conditioned upon bonding, court supervision of
settlements could help eliminate private deals between creditor-plain-
tiffs and directors which compromise the rights of the corporation, its
shareholders, or other creditors.90
Predatory litigation by competitors who acquired a claim against the
corporation in order to bring suit would present a separate problem.91
Predation could be largely controlled by a requirement that the plain-
tiff fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class of cred-
itors.9 2 This requirement would bar a creditor from prosecuting an
action if it appeared to the court that his interests in so doing would
be inimical of those of the corporation and its other creditors.
Creditors, like shareholders, should be required to make demand
upon the board of directors to bring suit before proceeding with a
suit of their own.9 3 Aside from the fact that compliance with such a
86. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 800(d), (e) (West 1977); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 627
(McKinney Supp. 1978).
87. For example, no creditor could bring suit unless his claim at the time of suit as
well as at the time of the alleged mismanagement equalled at least five percent of total
corporate assets.
88. Outright limitation of the right of action would, however, furnish quite effective
protection for debtors' privacy interest, see note 65 supra, since it would absolutely bar
smaller creditors from bringing derivative actions and hence from inspecting corporate
documents. It might, moreover, be attractive politically, since a moderate fixed-dollar
specification would have the effect of excluding very small debtors altogether.
89. Directors could thus attain, in effect, a waiver of the creditors' derivative right, an
undesirable result on public policy grounds. See note 66 supra.
90. This requirement already exists for shareholders' suits brought in federal court.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1. Its dual purposes there are to lessen the chance of meritless litigation
and to "prevent the unrighteous compromise of a just shareholder's action." 3B MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTicE, supra note 85, 23.1.24[1], at 129. It would have the same effect in
creditors' suits.
91. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 347-49 (1978) (effectiveness of "sham litiga-
tion" as method of commercial predation).
92. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (shareholders' suits).
93. Cf. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(b)(2) (West 1977) (shareholders' suits); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAw § 626(c) (McKinney 1963) (same).
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demand would make a creditors' action unnecessary, the cumulative
effect of creditors' demands might be beneficial to the efficient man-
agement of the corporation. 4 The demand requirement should be
waived, however, if a majority of directors participated in the alleged
mismanagement, because demand would then be fruitless.9
Demand upon shareholders should not be required, nor ratification 0
by them allowed. The statute creating the derivative right of action
would recognize creditors' interest in the financial integrity of solvent
corporations. Ratification could deprive creditors of the ability to pro-
tect that interest; it could, moreover, foreclose creditors' suits in pre-
cisely those situations in which they would be most useful. Shareholders,
or directors in control of the proxy machinery, should not be allowed to
frustrate in this manner creditors' attempts to enforce their new legal
rights.
Conclusion
The corporation at its best is an exceedingly effective device for
raising capital at limited risk. 97 At its worst it may be employed by an
entrepreneur to shield himself from the claims of creditors while he
expropriates corporate property for his personal benefit. The insolvency
remedies have evolved to deter this sort of conduct and to compensate
creditors injured by it. But these remedies reach only a portion of the
conduct injuring creditors, that occurring at or near the point of in-
solvency. A derivative right of action could close this important gap in
creditors' remedies and serve society's interest in promoting honest
conduct on the part of corporate management.
94. Cf. Note, Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative
Suit, 73 HARV. L. REV. 746, 748 (1960) (recognizing such effect in shareholders' suits).
95. This rule applies today in shareholders' derivative suits. See Parish v. Maryland &
Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 250 Md. 24, 81-84, 242 A.2d 512, 544-46 (1968).
96. It is widely recognized that a majority of shareholders cannot vote to ratify man-
agement conduct constituting "fraud" upon a dissenting minority. See 1 G. HORNSTEIN,
CORPORATION LAw & PRACTICE § 358 (1959 & Supp. 1968). Courts have never had occasion
to decide whether ratification by 100% of shareholders could bar a derivative action by
creditors against directors. A decision that it could not seems to follow from the nature
and purposes of the creditors' right of action. This conclusion should apply to all forms
of mismanagement actionable in the creditors' suit, whether or not they could be de-
nominated "fraud."
97. See THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 1926, at 1053 (inventor of principle of limited liability
deserves place of "honour with ... pioneers of the Industrial Revolution. The genius of
these men produced the means by which man's command of natural resources was
multiplied . . . ; limited liability . . . [produced] means by which the huge aggregations
of capital required to give practical effect to their discoveries were collected, organised,
and efficiently administered").
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